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Abstract 
Guidelines for conducting investigative interviews with children often include instructions that 
explain the conversational rules of the interview.  Despite the widespread and international use 
of such instructions (also referred to as “ground rules”), the body of research characterizing 
children’s  understanding  of  these  rules  and  documenting the impact of instruction on memory 
reports is relatively small.  We review the use of ground rules in investigative interviews, the 
developmental  differences  that  likely  underlie  children’s  ability  to  make  sense  of  these rules, and 
research pertaining to the effects of the ground rules commonly included in interview guidelines 
on the reports of 3- to 13-year-old children.  We then present a study space analysis concerning 
the five ground rules reviewed: (a) a statement about interviewer naïveté regarding the target 
events, (b) instructions to tell the interviewer when a mistake has been made, (c) cautions that 
some questions may be repeated, and instructions to say (d) “I  don’t  understand”  and  (e) “I  don’t  
know.”    The results demonstrate obvious gaps in this body of literature, with only  the  “I  don’t  
know”  ground  rule  having received significant attention.  In addition to exploring how individual 
rules impact interview performance, we encourage more process-oriented studies that relate 
developmental differences in ground rules benefits to the cognitive processes that underlie rule 
understanding and implementation.  Optimally, this research should identify the most suitable 
format and placement of instruction in interviews and broaden to more often include field studies 
of child witnesses.  
 Keywords: investigative interviewing, children, ground rules, interview instructions, 
metacognition 
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The Use of Ground Rules in Investigative Interviews with Children: A Synthesis and Call for 
Research 
Guidelines for conducting investigative interviews with children often include instructions 
(i.e., ground rules) that convey the communicative expectations of the interview.  These can 
include directives to  say  “I don’t  know”  when  prompted  information  cannot be recalled, to ask 
for clarification when misunderstandings arise, and to tell the interviewer when a mistake has 
been made.  The purpose of discussing ground rules is to make children aware that they are the 
experts on the events in question and to set the stage for a unique style of conversation that is 
likely to be unfamiliar to young witnesses (Lamb & Brown, 2006; Poole & Lamb, 1998).   
In daily life, children’s  conversations  often  involve  informed and familiar adults who are 
testing  children’s  memories  of  shared  experiences  or  emerging  knowledge  (e.g.  “Where  did  we  
go  this  morning?”  or  “What  kind  of  animal  is  this?”  Nelson & Fivush, 2000).  Even when adults 
lack  knowledge  of  target  events  (“What  did  you  do  at  school  today?”),  they  nonetheless  tend  to  
direct  conversations  with  prompts  that  provide  much  of  the  structure  and  content  for  children’s  
stories (Kelly & Bailey, 2013; Principe, DiPuppo, & Gammel, 2013). Children therefore know 
that adults usually expect answers to questions and want them to learn the new information 
embedded in conversations.  It is not surprising, then, that children often answer questions 
regardless of their level of certainty or understanding (Hughes & Grieve, 1987; Pratt, 1990; see 
Warren & McGough, 1996 for a review) and comply with adults’  suggestions (Ceci, Kulkofsky, 
Klemfuss, Sweeney, & Bruck, 2007; Principe et el., 2013). 
Supporters of ground rules fear that the power dynamic in investigative interviews, 
wherein children likely view interviewers as authority figures, will amplify unwanted speculation 
and acquiescence to suggestion.  Indeed, research has shown that children are more likely to 
accept suggestions from interviewers they believe to be knowledgeable rather than naïve 
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(Waterman, Blades, & Spencer, 2004; Welch-Ross, 1999) and from adults rather than peers 
(Toglia, Ross, Ceci, & Hembrooke, 1992).  Consequently, it seems prudent for interviewers to 
explain  that  “I  don’t  know”  is  an  acceptable  answer,  that  children  can  correct  interviewers’  
mistakes, and that children should report only memories of experienced events when potentially-
confusing situations arise during the course of an interview (e.g., that a repeated question does 
not  mean  the  child’s  previous  answer  was  inadequate). 
The prediction that children would benefit from ground rules emerged from analyses of the 
question forms investigative interviewers delivered most frequently, along with the accuracy of 
children’s  responses to these forms in analog studies, rather than in-depth understanding of the 
cognitive skills needed to comprehend and implement the rules.  Our primary position in this 
paper is that this very understanding is needed to advance the use of ground rules so interviewers 
explain instructions to children in the most optimal ways.  Although we acknowledge that 
motivational and emotional factors (e.g., being fatigued, under stress, or reluctant) may prevent 
children from benefitting from interview instructions (see Saywitz, 1995, for a discussion), in 
this review we focus on the cognitive factors that underlie the ability to understand and benefit 
from the rules.  After reviewing how ground rules are currently integrated into investigative 
interviews, we describe basic research on the emergence of cognitive skills that likely underlie 
ground rules benefits and analog studies that documented the impact of ground rules on 
testimonial quality.  Following discussion of these research traditions, we present a two-part 
study space analysis that identifies gaps in the literature and directions for future research.  
The Use of Ground Rules in Investigative Interviews 
Although guidelines unanimously advise interviewers to avoid complex vocabulary and 
to rely on open (i.e., free-recall) questions, even well-executed interviews contain numerous 
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specific (i.e., wh-) and option posing (multiple choice and yes-no) questions (e.g., Orbach, 
Hershkowitz, Lamb, Esplin, & Horowitz, 2000; see Lamb, Orbach, Hershkowitz, Esplin & 
Horowitz, 2007, for a review).  The high frequency of these question forms in front-line 
interviews is partly due to limited interviewing skills (e.g., Powell, Hughes-Scholes, & Sharman, 
2012) and partly because case exploration usually necessitates asking such questions (especially 
of very young children; Hershkowitz, Lamb, Orbach, Katz, & Horowitz, 2012). 
Although it is well known that the risk of inaccurate reports increases coincident with the 
specificity of questions (Waterman, Blades, & Spencer, 2000; 2004), commentators less 
frequently mention that open questions are not a magical elixir for truth (for a discussion, see 
Ceci et al., 2007).  In fact, open questions can be misleading with respect to content (Sharman & 
Powell, 2012) and temporal details (Powell, Roberts, Thomson, 2000), and children may not be 
able to recall prompted information or may retrieve related information in its place (due to 
mechanisms underlying confabulation or source-monitoring confusions; e.g., Poole & Lindsay, 
2001).  Therefore, supporters of ground rules argue that instructions are warranted even when 
interviewers use a nondirective questioning style.   
   To address these problems, many interviewing guidelines had adopted ground rules by 
the 1990s (e.g., Memorandum of Good Practice, Home Office, 1992 [later Achieving Best 
Evidence in Criminal Proceedings, Ministry of Justice, 2011]; the NICHD Protocol, Orbach et 
al., 2000 [with ongoing revisions, see Hershkowitz, Lamb, Katz, & Malloy, 2013]; Forensic 
Interviewing Protocol, State  of  Michigan  Governor’s  Task  Force  on  Children’s  Justice and 
Department of Human Services, 1998 [third  edition  from  the  State  of  Michigan  Governor’s  Task  
Force on Child Abuse and Neglect and Department of Human Services, 2011]; Oregon 
Interviewing Guidelines, Bourg et al., 1998 [third edition DeClue et al., 2012]; the Step-Wise 
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Interview, Yuille, Hunter, Joffe, & Zaparniuk, 1993 [later the Step-Wise Guidelines, Yuille, 
Cooper, & Hervé, 2009]).  Over the years, these guidelines were revised based on research 
findings and feedback from investigative interviewers.  For example, later versions of the 
NICHD Protocol (Lamb et al., 2007) included additional rules and delayed the delivery of the 
rules (in the Revised protocol) until children had completed a narrative practice phase (recall of a 
nontarget event) to give interviewers more time to establish themselves as friendly and naïve (see 
Lamb, Hershkowitz, & Lyon, 2013).  Today, Achieving Best Evidence guidelines support the 
early introduction of ground rules, but it is at interviewers’ discretion when to do so.  
Furthermore, interviewers have the option of restating rules after the free narrative account is 
complete but before specific questioning commences (Ministry of Justice, 2011).  Similarly, in 
the Developmental Narrative Elaboration Interview, Saywitz and Camparo (2014) present 
interview instructions as a set of tools and encourage interviewers to choose the most appropriate 
tools for each child and interview situation (rather than recommending a fixed set of rules for all 
interviews).    
Though ground rules are widely discussed in interview protocols, guidelines have not 
unanimously favored the practice of front-loading interviews with ground rules instruction.  For 
example, the RATAC protocol (developed by CornerHouse, an abuse evaluation center) 
advocated instruction only as problems arose during interviews, citing the time it takes to deliver 
ground rules (during which children could become inattentive), young children’s  lack of 
understanding of the instructions, and weak evidence for the effectiveness of instruction, as 
limitations of a discrete interview phase (Anderson et al., 2010; see also Russell, 2006).  
(CornerHouse recently began to include “orienting messages” at the beginning of interviews with 
reinforcing comments as issues arise; Anderson, 2013; 2014).  The StepWise Guidelines (Yuille 
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et al., 2009) also encouraged interviewers to reinforce use of the rules when children show 
desired behaviors during the course of an interview  (e.g.,  “…  that’s  good, Mary.  I am only 
interested in things you can remember”) rather than delivering them at the outset. 
Overall, there is agreement that ground rules should be mentioned in investigative 
protocols but no uniformity across guidelines regarding the recommended format, placement, or 
extent of instruction.  For the field to progress beyond the simple realization that children need 
clarification of their role as expert informants, it is necessary to determine how effective 
interview instructions actually are for children at different levels of cognitive development.  A 
satisfying answer to this question will entail a two-pronged approach: first, understanding which 
cognitive structures must be in place before children can understand and implement each ground 
rule (which sets boundary conditions on the appropriateness of various ground rules for children 
in different age brackets) and, second, determining the efficacy of instruction on the quality of 
children’s testimony.  As we will show, the existing database provides only spotty answers to 
these questions.     
How Developing Cognitions Help Children Make Sense of Ground Rules 
 Although direct evidence is lacking, numerous cognitive skills that develop during early 
and middle childhood should theoretically influence the degree to which children can benefit 
from various ground rules.  An obvious candidate process is theory of mind (ToM), which is a 
broad set of skills supporting understanding of the mental states of the self and others (Premack 
& Woodruff, 1978).  Two measures of ToM are arguably relevant for ground-rules 
understanding: knowledge access and false belief (see Wellman & Liu, 2004, for task 
descriptions and developmental trajectories).  The former refers to an understanding of how 
knowledge and event memories are acquired (e.g., through direct experience) and who has access 
to that information.  Without a developed understanding of knowledge access, children are 
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unlikely to benefit from being told that the interviewer is naïve to the  child’s  experience (e.g., 
see Koenig & Harris, 2005; Waterman et al., 2004; Welch-Ross, 1999).  Relatedly, the 
understanding that others can hold false beliefs may be relevant to ground rules that instruct 
children to correct the interviewer when a mistake has been made.  These skills tend to develop 
between the ages of 4 and 6 years, with most children passing knowledge access tasks at an 
earlier age than false belief tasks (Peterson, Wellman & Slaughter, 2012; Wellman & Liu, 2004). 
Metacognitive skills should also be important for understanding of ground rules.  
Metacognition refers to the ability to reflect on one’s own thoughts and mental processes 
(Flavell, 1979; Sodian, Thoermer, Kristen, & Perst, 2012).  The awareness that a question was 
difficult because the vocabulary was not understood is an example of this skill, as is recognizing 
whether one has or does not have access to information (rather than reflexively taking a guess or 
replying  “I  don’t  know”  when  information  does  not  come  quickly to mind).  Reasoning about 
memories, called metamemory, involves knowledge  and  understanding  about  one’s  own  
memory, including its capabilities and how it can be influenced (Flavell & Wellman, 1977). 
Two components of metacognition have been distinguished: declarative and procedural 
(although other terms have been used; see Schneider & Lockl, 2002, for a review).  Declarative 
metacognition refers to knowing what factors influence cognition and why (e.g., with respect to 
metamemory, knowing that if you cannot remember feeling a particular bodily touch then you 
may not have directly experienced it), whereas procedural metacognition refers to the online 
application of that knowledge (e.g., rejecting the notion that you actually experienced the touch 
and reasoning that someone told you about it).  Procedural metacognition is relatively age 
independent because many factors influence implementation, such that young children may be 
capable of metacognitive insights on some tasks but not others (Schneider & Lockl, 2008).  For 
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example, Waterman and colleagues (2000) demonstrated that children as young as 5- to 6-years-
old could distinguish between sensible and nonsensical questions when asked if questions were 
silly.  When asked to answer the questions, however, the children provided responses to 
nonsensical yes-no questions (e.g.,  “Is  a  box  louder  than  a  knee?”)  but  said  “don’t  know”  in  
reply to questions that were not option-posing (e.g.,  “Where  do  circles  live?”).    
Reflecting on knowledge access when asked option-posing questions may require stronger 
procedural metacognitive skills than what is required in the face of recall-based questions (e.g., 
wh- and open-ended).  The former question-type affords responses (that is, a choice of options 
can be made without further processing), whereas the latter are typically answered only when 
knowledge is present (Waterman, Blades, & Spencer, 2001; Waterman et al., 2004).  Further 
support for this suggestion comes from a recent study by Rohwer, Kloo, and Perner (2012) in 
which children (2 to 7 years) had to guess the identity of a toy hidden in a box.  When they were 
completely ignorant about the contents, they were highly accurate at admitting that they did not 
know (although only the 6- and 7-year-olds were able to provide reasonable justifications for 
why they did not know; e.g.,  “You did not show me.”).    When  children  saw two possible objects 
before one was hidden in the box, however, the younger children often made a guess (70%), 
whereas the 6- and 7-year-old children did not (6%).  The provision of a response option 
afforded an answer, just as forced-choice questions do.   
Evidence that procedural metacognition develops most rapidly in the early elementary-
school years comes from Fritz, Howie, and Kleitman (2010), who found a large increase in 
performance between 6- to 8-years-old with continued but slower improvement towards the end 
of elementary school.  An oft-cited set of experiments by Markman (1979), aimed at 
characterizing  children’s  comprehension  monitoring,  found stronger evidence for later 
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development.  Eight- to 11-year-olds listened to short stories that were missing critical 
information required for comprehension (e.g., a story about making baked Alaska did not explain 
that there is meringue around the ice cream to prevent it melting in the hot oven).  Despite 
demonstrating excellent memory for the content of the stories, many children failed to realize 
that their comprehension was incomplete.  In a follow-up experiment (Study 3), half of the 8- 
and 12-year-old  children  were  warned  that  there  was  “something  tricky”  about  each of the stories 
and  were  asked  to  “spot  the  problem.”    The  explicit warning conferred more benefit to the 12- 
than 8-year-olds but improved the performance of both age groups over non-warned children.  
Similarly, London, Bruck, Poole, and Melnyk (2011) found that it was not until 12 to 13 years 
that children could consistently understand and explain why a protagonist was led to make a 
false report through suggestive interviewing.  Without this awareness, even children given a rule 
(e.g., “correct me  if  I  make  a  mistake”) may not recognize situations in which the interviewer is 
wrong. 
Once relevant concept knowledge and online monitoring are in place, the potential for 
ground rule instruction to impact testimonial quality rests on other developmental advances—
most notably, the ability to hold a rule in mind during the course of an interview and to inhibit 
prepotent responses in order to apply a rule as needed.  Because working memory and inhibitory 
control continue to develop well into adolescence, and performance is task-dependent, it is likely 
that some children who can demonstrate rule understanding will nonetheless derive no benefit 
from instruction due to insufficient executive skills.  (See Shing, Lindenberger, Diamond, Li, & 
Davidson, 2010, for a discussion of memory maintenance and inhibitory control from early 
childhood to adolescence.) 
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In sum, basic research findings do not lead us to expect a simple situation whereby 
children above a particular age are most likely to benefit from ground rules instruction.  At best, 
developmental theory explains why instruction has proven more challenging for children less 
than 6 (see Yuille et al., 2009), but the fact that even older children do not consistently monitor 
comprehensibility or reflect on social influence suggests the possibility of a protracted 
developmental period during which the usefulness of interview instructions may be highly task-
dependent.  Thus basic research findings are currently insufficient for crafting ground rules 
policy, which ultimately must rest on the efficacy or nonefficacy of interview instructions in 
analog and field research.  After describing our rationale for selecting ground rules and studies in 
the next section, we review the extant research underlying the most widely-studied and/or 
frequently recommended ground rules (see Table 1 for an alphabetical list of experiments) and 
the circumstances under which children of various ages (from 3- to 13-years-old) benefit from 
the instructions.   
Selection of Ground Rules and Studies for Review 
We first examined interview protocols and guidelines to determine which instructions were 
most often recommended.  These were identified as (a) information about interviewer naiveté 
(Lyon, 2010; Powell & Lancaster, 2003; Saywitz & Camparo, 2014); (b) instructions to correct 
the interviewer when a mistake had been made (Anderson, 2014; Lamb et al., 2007; Lyon, 2010; 
Saywitz & Camparo, 2014); (c) a caution that sometimes questions may be repeated (Powell & 
Lancaster, 2003; Saywitz, Geiselman, & Bronstein, 1992); and instructions to tell the interviewer 
when the child (d) does not understand (Anderson, 2014; Lamb et al., 2007; Lyon, 2010; Powell 
& Lancaster, 2003; Saywitz & Camparo, 2014) and (e) does not know the answer (Anderson, 
2014; Lamb et al., 2007; Lyon, 2010; Powell & Lancaster, 2003; Saywitz et al., 1992; Saywtiz & 
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Camparo, 2014).  We then sought research associated with these rules by searching PsychInfo 
and Google Scholar for “ground rules,” “interview instructions” and words used during delivery 
of the rules (“naïve,” “I  wasn’t  there,” “make a mistake,” “correct me,” “questions [may be] 
repeated,” “don’t  know,” “don’t  understand”).  Next, we reviewed the reference lists of the 
studies obtained to identify whether any research had been missed.  We included only those 
studies in which some children but not others were delivered a rule and its efficacy was tested. 
We omitted less-frequently employed rules (e.g., that the child may use any words s/he chooses; 
see Powell and Lancaster, 2003, for this and other examples) and a variety of other “preparatory” 
tasks that are beyond the scope of this review, including source-monitoring instructions (e.g., 
Poole & Lindsay, 2001) and narrative practice (Roberts, Brubacher, Powell, & Price, 2011).   
Although truth/lie discussions are sometimes included in a ground rules phase, we omitted 
this topic from our review because there is relatively good consensus on  children’s  responses  to  
truth/lie questions (Lyon, 2011) and a comprehensive review is available (Talwar & Crossman, 
2012).    Children’s competency to understand the difference between truth and lies is rarely 
assessed in English-speaking countries (except in the U.S.), but such “tests” do sometimes 
appear in investigative interviews (Evans & Lyon, 2012).  Most children can distinguish true 
statements from lies by 4- to 5-years old (Bussey, 1992; Lyon & Saywitz, 1999), and although 
the relationship between understanding the truth and truth-telling tends to be weak or non-
existent (Talwar, Lee, Bala, & Lindsay, 2002), truth-telling is increased by asking children to 
swear or promise to tell the truth (Talwar et al., 2002; see Talwar & Crossman, 2012, for a 
review).   
Research on Individual Ground Rules  
Interviewer naiveté: “I  wasn’t  there…” Many interview guidelines include a statement 
about  the  interviewer’s  naiveté along with the importance of reporting every detail that can be 
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recalled.  Such statements are meant to increase the amount of information children report while 
reducing the power dynamic that promotes acquiesce to interviewers’ suggestions (Lamb & 
Brown, 2006; Mulder & Vrij, 1996).  It seems likely that children would benefit most from the 
naiveté rule after they have developed a rudimentary understanding of ToM sufficient to grasp 
the concept that the interviewer does not have the same access to information as they do.  
Consistent with this idea, some evidence suggests that children who have recently developed 
ToM profit more from this rule than do older children.  When they provided a statement about 
interviewer naiveté, Waterman and Blades (2011) found that only their 6-year-old participants 
benefitted in comparison to a control group, whereas the 8-year-olds were unaffected.  Because 
all children in their experiment were given permission  to  say  “don’t  know,”  the  authors  
suggested that the extra reminder about interviewer naiveté was unnecessary for the older 
children.        
Some studies that employed this  ground  rule  as  a  direct  statement  (e.g.,  “I  wasn’t  there,  I  
don’t know what happened”)  also  simultaneously  included  other  rules  (e.g.,  Beuscher  &  
Roebers, 2005; Cordón, Saetermoe, & Goodman, 2005; Geddie, Beer, Bartosik, & Wuensch, 
2001; Krackow & Lynn, 2010; Saywitz & Moan-Hardie, 1994).  For example, in addition to 
modeling  complete  recall  and  correcting  an  interviewer’s  mistakes,  Krackow  and  Lynn  (2010)  
gave 4- to 5- and 7- to 8-year-old children in their training group an explanatory statement about 
naiveté  (“Sometimes adults ask questions in a way that makes it sound like they know the 
answers.  However, unless an adult was there with you, they do not know the answers.” p. 874).  
Training increased open-ended recall without increasing errors among older children and 
reduced suggestibility to misleading questions in the preschool group.  Mulder and Vrij (1996) 
crossed the naiveté rule with the “don’t  know” rule in their study of 4- to 5- and 8- to 10-year-old 
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children, resulting in a 2 x 2 x 2 design.  They found that the naiveté rule reduced incorrect 
answers to misleading questions for children of both age groups and  across  both  “don’t  know”  
conditions, thereby providing the only evidence of the effects of this rule in isolation.   
Interviewing guidelines that include a narrative practice phase (see Roberts et al., 2011, for 
a review) may bolster the effectiveness of this ground rule.  Among the primary goals of a 
practice phase are (a) to give the child an opportunity to be the expert about a neutral event that 
is unfamiliar to the interviewer and (b) to practice responding to open-ended questions with 
sufficient detail.  It has been suggested that inclusion of this phase can model interviewer naiveté 
for children while discussing a neutral topic (e.g., La Rooy, Brown & Lamb, 2013).  Indeed, 
because the practice phase trains children to report everything they can remember about an 
event, even very young children lacking a well-developed theory-of-mind may nevertheless learn 
to adopt the role of the expert through practice.  
General warnings and  specific  instructions  to  correct  interviewers’  mistakes.  
Motivated by evidence that adults’  suggestibility  can be reduced by warnings about  “tricky”  
questions (e.g., Chambers & Zaragosa, 2001; Greene, Flynn, & Loftus, 1982), a few experiments 
focused on the benefits of similar warnings for children, without explicitly instructing them to 
correct the interviewer when a mistake had been made (Beuscher & Roebers, 2005; Cordón et 
al., 2005; Endres, Poggenpohl, & Erben, 1999; Warren, Hulse-Trotter, & Tubbs, 1991).  All but 
Beucher and Roebers (2005) reported benefits, but only Warren and colleagues focused 
exclusively on the warning instruction.  These investigators told one group of 1st graders, 6th 
graders, and adults that some of the questions about a story would be “tricky.”  The warning 
reduced acquiescence to leading questions in all age groups but also hampered the performance 
of the 1st graders, who were more likely to change their answers to non-leading questions after 
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feedback that they had not performed well on the first round of questions.  Thus a warning 
heightened resistance to suggestibility but also made the youngest children more doubtful of 
their memories, at least in a context where negative feedback was provided.  (In actual forensic 
interviews, such feedback is strongly discouraged; Lamb et al., 2007; Saywitz & Camparo, 
2014).  In contrast, Endres and colleagues (Study 1, 1999) found that a warning benefitted both 
4- and 7-year-olds.  The discrepancy in findings may be due to the fact that while Warren and 
colleagues (1991, p. 278) told  children  to  “be  sure  that  their  answers  reflected  only  what  they  
really remembered about the story,”  Endres and colleagues told their participants what to do 
when a question was tricky (say  “I  don’t  know”).  
Warnings about questions (i.e., that they may be “tricky” or may contain wrong details) 
may help children gate out some inaccurate post-event misinformation.  A warning can make 
people more aware of sources of influence on their reports (e.g., that their memory trace is for 
something the interviewer said after the event rather than from the original event itself).  The 
effects of misinformation may not be completely eliminated by a warning, however, due to 
“unaware” sources of influence (i.e., true source-monitoring errors; Lindsay, Gonzales, & Eso, 
1995; see Holliday, Reyna, & Hayes, 2002, for a review).    
To our knowledge, only one study found no effect of warning children that questions might 
include incorrect information.  Beuscher and Roebers (2005) showed a short video to 6-, 8-, and 
10-year olds and then interviewed them 1 week later with free-recall followed by specific 
questions.    There  were  clear  developmental  differences  in  children’s  ability  to  answer  both  
misleading and non-misleading questions but no effect of a warning.  The most striking 
difference between this study and the previous ones is the delay between event and interview: 
The other experiments involving a general warning had interviewed children within just 1 day of 
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the to-be-remembered event (Cordón et al., 2005, interviewed children three times but the first 
interview was immediate). Because memory traces fade with the passage of time, making them 
more prone to error (e.g., Jones & Pipe, 2002; Powell, Roberts, Ceci, & Hembrooke, 1999), it is 
possible  that  children  in  Beuscher  and  Roebers’  study  were  less  able to identify misleading 
questions compared to children who were interviewed soon after the event.  
General warnings about questions are absent from most interview guidelines, likely due to 
the emphasis placed on training interviewers to avoid leading or suggestive questions (Lamb, 
1995).  Nevertheless, blunders can and do occur in interviewers’ questions.  For example, 
interviewers’ paraphrases  of  children’s  statements  frequently  contain  errors that children fail to 
correct (Roberts & Lamb, 1999).  To reduce this unwanted compliance, some guidelines instead 
include  a  rule  to  correct  the  interviewer’s  mistakes.  We identified five articles (seven 
experiments) that included such instruction, of which three reported benefits and two did not.  
Both Ellis and colleagues (Ellis, Powell, Thomson, & Jones, 2003) and Geddie et al. (2001) 
failed to demonstrate benefits of any of their ground rules, which included instruction to correct 
the interviewer.  In the former, children were simply given the rule without practice, and in the 
latter rules and practice were delivered by a different assistant than the interviewer, which has 
been shown to reduce accuracy (Saywitz, Snyder, & Nathanson, 1999).  
Similar to Geddie et al. (2001), Gee, Gregory, and Pipe (1999), Krackow and Lynn (2010), 
and Saywitz and Moan-Hardie (1994) provided practice in correcting the interviewer but using 
different procedures.  Gee et al. (1999) trained half of their 9- to 13-year-old participants to tell 
the interviewer when they did not know an answer or thought there was no answer.  These 
children were also given practice questions in which the appropriate response was  either  “I  don’t  
know”  (e.g.,  “Is my middle name Barbara or Jane?”) or a  statement  correcting  the  interviewer’s  
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wrong assumption  (e.g.,  “What  color  is  your  pet  dinosaur?”).    Children  were  praised  for  “don’t  
know”  responses  and also told that it was okay to correct the interviewer.  In Study 1, training 
reduced both errors and correct responses.  By encouraging and reinforcing correct responses to 
non-misleading questions in training, Study 2 evinced decreases in error rates without a 
corresponding decrease in accuracy.  Yet, because the focus was on instructing children to say 
“don’t  know”  when the interviewer made a mistake, it is difficult to disentangle the two 
instructions in these experiments.   
Krackow and Lynn (2010) and Saywitz and Moan-Hardie (1994) gave children very 
explicit instructions about correcting interviewers (e.g., in the latter, the training group was 
taught to use self-statements such as “I  won’t  go  along.    I’ll  tell  her  she’s  wrong.” p. 415).  Two 
weeks after a live event involving bodily touch, 4- to 5- and 7- to 8-year-old children in Krackow 
and  Lynn’s training condition were given modeling and practice in correcting the interviewer.  
These children first watched a video of a boy playing with a remote control dog and then 
watched another video of a child (“Johnny”) answering misleading and non-misleading questions 
about that event.  Sometimes Johnny failed to correct the interviewer’s mistakes, and trained 
children were told that “Johnny  did  not  really  break  the  dog,  so  he  should  have  told  the  grown  up  
no.  It is okay for children to say no when a grown up  asks  about  something  that  did  not  happen”  
(p. 875).  Children  then  practiced  correcting  the  interviewer’s  questions  about  an  unrelated  video.    
The children in a control condition engaged in non-training activities for an equal amount of 
time.  The chief finding was that training reduced suggestibility to misleading questions among 
the 4- to 5-year-old children, raising their accuracy to the level of the 7- to 8-year-old children 
(which was near ceiling and not affected by training).  With similar intensive training procedures 
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(i.e., discussion, modeling, and feedback), Saywitz and Moan-Hardie (1994) also found benefits 
from their training package.          
Some questions may be repeated.  Children sometimes change answers when 
interviewers repeat questions (see Fivush & Schwarzmueller, 1995, for a review), although this 
effect is largely limited to closed/specific rather than open questions (see Poole & White, 1991, 
1995) and is less common in the field than in the lab (La Rooy & Lamb, 2011).  But despite the 
fact that repeated questions occur in investigative interviews (La Rooy & Lamb, 2011; Lamb & 
Fauchier, 2001), only a few interview guidelines have included instructions designed to reduce 
unwanted response changes.  We identified only two studies that specifically gave children 
instructions about repeated questions, with neither reporting pronounced benefits (Geddie et al., 
2001; Memon & Vartoukian, 1996).     
In Memon and Vartoukian’s  (1996)  study, 5- to 8-year olds witnessed a brief staged event 
and were interviewed about it 5 minutes later.  Children were told that they should not make up 
answers when they could not remember, and half were also warned that some questions may be 
repeated.  The warning did not affect the 5-year-olds, somewhat impeded the accuracy of the 7-
year-olds in response to open questions, and had no other effects.  The main finding of interest, 
however, was that correct information increased across repeated open questions but decreased 
across repeated closed questions.  Geddie and colleagues (2001) told 3- to 6-year-olds that a 
repeated question did not mean the first answer was incorrect, and the children then practiced 
responding to repeated questions.  Children were given several rules, and after all rules had been 
delivered and practiced the children restated the rules.  Any omitted rules were provided again, 
and the interview did not begin until children could spontaneously and correctly answer 
questions that tested each rule.  Despite these efforts, the researchers noted that children 
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struggled with this task, which echoes  Memon  and  Vartoukian’s  suggestion that the younger 
children in their sample may not have understood the instruction.  Geddie and colleagues found 
no effects of the warning on  children’s  reports. 
Evidence suggests that repeated questions are not problematic for children if they 
understand that the purpose of repetition is something other than a challenge to their previous 
response (La Rooy & Lamb, 2011; but see Howie, Nash, Kurukulasuriya & Bowman, 2012).  
Howie, Sheehan, Mojarrad and Wrzesinska (2004) did not give 4- to 5- and 7- to 8-year-olds a 
warning about repeated questions but instead provided a rationale to half of the children (i.e., the 
experimenter’s  hand  was  sore  and  so  she  could  not take notes).  Providing a rationale did not 
affect the overall frequency of shifting responses but did reduce undesirable shifts (i.e., from 
correct to incorrect) among younger children and increased desirable shifts (i.e., from incorrect 
to correct) in all children who heard the rationale.   
 The  “don’t  understand” rule.  There is surprisingly little research in the eyewitness 
memory area on instructing children to tell interviewers when they do not understand something 
(such as an entire question or a word in a question).  This is an important omission given that 
many legal situations involve terminology that children have not yet acquired (Cooper, Wallin, 
Quas, & Lyon, 2010; Saywitz, Jaenicke, & Camparo, 1990) and questions that are semantically 
complex (Korkman, Santilla, Drzewiecki, & Sandnabba, 2008; Zajac,  O’Neill,  &  Hayne,  2012).  
Children  can  say  “don’t  know”  to  such  questions,  but  this response may not accurately reflect 
their knowledge.   
There are many examples of children failing to indicate explicitly when they have not 
understood.  For example, Hughes and Grieve (1980) and Pratt (1990) documented that children 
(and in some cases adults) attempt to answer bizarre questions that are semantically 
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incomprehensible.  Flavell, Speer, Green and August (1981) found that 8-year-olds implicitly 
demonstrated some degree of confusion (both verbally [e.g.,  “huh?”]  and with facial and motor 
behaviors) when listening to ambiguous task-completion instructions, and 6-year-olds did so to a 
lesser extent, whereas Markman (1979) found that much older children often failed to identify 
comprehension monitoring errors.  Children are even less likely to indicate comprehension 
failures in unfamiliar situations such as an investigative interview or courtroom (Saywitz, 1995).  
The cross-examination literature is rife with evidence of children responding to questions they 
did not comprehend (see Zajac et al., 2012, for a review).  Thus, it is clear that this ground rule is 
important but, as we have noted, the concept underlying it may be challenging from a cognitive-
developmental perspective.  Furthermore, it may be particularly difficult for children to monitor 
their uncertainty during tasks involving abstract concepts like memories as opposed to tasks 
involving concrete stimuli (e.g., perceptual identification tasks, such as guessing the identity of a 
degraded picture; Ghetti, Hembacher, & Coughlin, 2013).   
We identified just two studies in which children were explicitly instructed to tell the 
interviewer when a misunderstanding had occurred.  Peters and Nunez (1999) and Saywitz et al. 
(1999) trained some of their participating children in “comprehension monitoring” (CM).  In 
both studies, the children were made aware of negative consequences associated with answering 
questions they did not understand; taught to  recognize  when  an  interviewers’  question  contained  
difficult vocabulary, structure, or was otherwise incomprehensible (e.g., due to mumbling); given 
practice saying they did not understand; and instructed to ask for clarification or rephrasing.  In 
addition, they were given feedback and discouraged from guessing.   
In Peters and Nunez’s (1999) research, CM strategies were taught to preschoolers, 
kindergartners, and second-graders over a period of three training sessions and then, on testing 
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day, they watched a video and were interviewed about it immediately afterwards.  In contrast, 
Saywitz and colleagues engaged 6- and 8-year-olds in a live event and 2 weeks later those in the 
CM condition were trained; testing took place two days later following a 15-min booster session. 
Despite differences in age groups, event presentation (video/live), and delay from event to test, 
both studies revealed that children of all age groups who received CM training were more likely 
to ask that difficult questions be rephrased, and CM-trained children provided more accurate 
information than did the children in other types of training and control conditions.  In the Peters 
and Nunez study, 91% of children in the CM group requested at least one complex question be 
rephrased in contrast to only 52% of children who did not receive CM training.  Saywitz and 
colleagues demonstrated that children who had participated in CM training were significantly 
more accurate and less inaccurate than children who received “rephrasing instructions” (i.e., told 
to notify the interviewer when they did not understand without practice feedback or 
reinforcement), who were more accurate and less inaccurate than those in the control condition.  
(Due to the coding of “don’t  know” as a separate response category, accuracy and inaccuracy 
were not inverse proportions.)  Finally, children in the CM group were most likely to ask that 
confusing questions be reworded.  
The  “I  don’t  know” rule.  By far, the “don’t  know” rule has been the subject of most 
ground rules research.  It could be argued that this is the most important interview instruction 
because even when children are unable to identify why a question is tricky (e.g., the interviewer 
has used a word the child does not understand or the interviewer has made a mistake/delivered 
misinformation), saying  “don’t  know”  will  reduce  potential  commission  errors.  Nevertheless, 
we argue, as have others (e.g., Scoboria & Fisico, 2013), that saying “I  don’t  know” can have 
different purposes.  For example,  “I  don’t  know because…:”  “I  can’t  remember,”  “I  don’t  
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understand (a word, or the question),”  and  “You made a mistake (and  so  I  don’t  know  how  to  
respond)”  reflect  different  cognitive  states  and serve different practical purposes in an 
investigative interview.  Thus, for both theoretical and applied reasons, developmental 
differences  in  children’s  propensity  and  ability  to  provide  these  responses  should  be  explored.      
We identified 12 articles (15 experiments) in which only some of the children were given 
the  “don’t  know” ground rule, permitting assessment of its effect.  (There are numerous studies 
in which all participants were provided  instructions  to  say  “don’t  know”  because  the  focus was 
on other aspects of  “don’t  know”  responding, such as the effect of question-type or instruction 
placement; e.g., Beuscher & Roebers, 2005; Memon & Vartoukian, 1996; Roebers & Schneider, 
2005; Waterman & Blades, 2012; Waterman et al., 2000; 2004.)   
A meta-analysis on these 15 experiments was not desirable for several reasons.  First, once 
important variables were considered (i.e., age, delay, whether or not the event was live, and 
whether or not the rule was practiced), there were too few studies per cell to permit meaningful 
analysis.  To our surprise, we also uncovered two more important reasons: To date, practice of 
the rule has been confounded with the delay between events and interviews, and with the live 
presentation of events.  Of the 12 articles, five did not include practice of the “don’t  know” rule 
(Ellis et al., 2003; Endres et al., 1999; Moston, 1987; Nesbitt & Markham, 1999; Peterson & 
Grant, 2001) and five did (Cordón et al., 2005; Geddie et al., 2001; Gee et al., 1999; Mulder & 
Vrij, 1996; Saywitz & Moan-Hardie, 1994).  (Two cannot be classified according to practice, 
Roebers, Moga, & Schneider, 2001, and Roebers & Fernandez, 2002.  We elaborate on this latter 
point later in this article.)  Of the five articles that did not include practice, three used a delay of 
less than 1 day (all but Ellis et al. and Peterson & Grant).  Of the five that did include practice, 
most included delays of at least 1 week (all but Mulder & Vrij; Cordón et al. employed repeated 
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interviews from immediate to as long as 5 weeks).  In addition, these latter studies all involved 
live events, whereas those without practice included live and non-live events in roughly equal 
proportion.    We  divide  our  review  of  the  “don’t  know”  ground  rule  first  by  whether  or  not  
practice was involved and then by the extent to which the rule yielded effects.      
The experiments in which children were instructed  to  say  “don’t  know”  without  practice 
have yielded mixed results, although inspection of the procedures sheds light on why these 
discrepancies exist.  In two experiments, the rule was simply stated and participants were very 
young (maximum age 5 years old);;  these  yielded  no  effect  of  the  “don’t  know”  ground  rule  (Ellis 
et al., 2003, Peterson & Grant, 2001).  Moston (1987) found partial benefits after a simple 
statement: The  instruction  increased  “don’t  know”  responses  among  6-, 8-, and 10-year-olds but 
did not improve accuracy.  
Three experiments found  strong  benefits  of  the  “don’t  know”  rule  without  practice  (Endres 
et al., 1999 [Study 1 and 2], Nesbitt & Markham, 1999).  In these experiments, however, 
children were given very explicit and/or thorough explanations.  In Nesbitt and Markham (1999), 
3- to 5-year-old children in the instruction group watched a fox-puppet model in situations in 
which he should say “I  don’t  know.”  This instruction phase lasted 20 minutes.  All children then 
watched a videotaped event and heard a story containing misinformation.  They were tested after 
a brief delay, during which the instruction group was reminded to say “don’t  know.”   Instruction 
significantly increased the number of “don’t  know” responses and the overall proportion correct.  
The training provided by Endres et al. (1999) for two studies was much briefer, but children in 
the experimental condition received an example that was not only explicit but also directly 
connected to the target task (e.g., Study 1: “If  I  asked  you  how  old  the  grandmother  was  in  the  
story,  you  should  say  ‘I  don’t  know’  because  the  story did not really say anything about her age.” 
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p. 134).  Thus, in these three experiments,  children  did  not  practice  saying  “don’t  know”  but  
received very clear instructions about how and why they should do so.   
We now turn to research in which children practiced  saying  “I  don’t  know”  prior  to  an  
interview (Cordón et al., 2005, Geddie et al., 2001, Gee et al., 1999; Mulder & Vrij, 1996; 
Saywitz & Moan-Hardie, 1994). With the exception of Geddie et al. (2001), all found benefits of 
instruction.  Although the children who participated in Geddie et al. were roughly the same age 
as those in  Cordón  and  colleagues’  research, and Geddie  et  al.’s  design  did  not  involve  the 
longest delay, as mentioned earlier the instructions and interviews were delivered by different 
assistants.  Additionally,  children’s  accuracy  for  the  event  was  very  high  in Geddie et al. (e.g., 
even 69% of misleading questions were answered correctly).   
The studies of Gee et al. (2001) and Saywitz and Moan-Hardie (1994) both involved two 
experiments  because  in  the  first,  instructing  children  to  say  “don’t  know”  increased  such  
responses but also led to fewer correct responses (i.e., children were overusing the instruction).  
The researchers improved these instructions by also encouraging children to respond to questions 
they did understand or for which they were able to retrieve the information.  Relatedly, Mulder 
and Vrij (1996) found more  strategic  use  of  “don’t  know”  responding  among  children  who  had  
received  both  the  “don’t  know”  rule  and the statement about interviewer naiveté than among 
children who received either rule alone.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that it is important to have children practice the 
“don’t  know”  ground  rule  but  that practice responding to unanswerable questions in isolation 
may increase  “don’t  know”  responding  in  a  non-strategic way.  In practice, most interview 
guidelines advocate for inclusion (and practice) of several ground rules, and there is evidence to 
support this recommendation: The children  in  Cordón  and  colleagues’  (2005)  study  who received 
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three ground rules (i.e., interviewer naiveté, tricky questions, and “don’t  know”) performed 
better than those who received only two or one (along with placebo rules that held constant the 
number of rules delivered; e.g.,  “We  take  turns”).  We propose that the narrative practice phase 
may  be  particularly  helpful  in  combination  with  the  “don’t  know”  ground  rule, and we encourage 
systematic testing of this hypothesis.  Because the practice phase gives children experience being 
the expert and reporting about a recent event they should remember well, there may be 
opportunities for interviewers to ask unanswerable questions during  this  phase  (e.g.,  “What 
happened at the soccer park after  you  left?”).    
We alluded earlier to a set of studies by Roebers and her colleagues (Roebers & Fernandez, 
2002; Roebers et al., 2001) that could not be categorized with regard to the inclusion of practice.  
In these studies, 6- to 8-year olds (and adults) watched a target video and were interviewed 3 
weeks later.  There were three interview conditions: forced report (“don’t  know” responses 
forbidden), free report (“don’t  know” responses permitted), and free report plus incentives.  
Children in the latter condition received rewards for correct responses and penalties for incorrect 
responses; “don’t  know” responses yielded neither reward nor penalty (see also Koriat, 
Goldsmith, Schneider, & Nakash-Dura, 2001).  Children could use tokens at the end of the study 
to get a prize, and bigger prizes were purportedly worth more tokens.  Overall, both studies 
found that the incentives condition produced the highest quality responses, and the forced report 
the lowest quality, across age groups.  The incentives condition also yielded the greatest 
proportion  of  “don’t  know”  responses.             
In both of the earlier studies conducted by Roebers and her colleagues (Roebers & 
Fernandez, 2002; Roebers et al., 2001), as well as in Roebers and Schneider (2005; Experiment 
1), the free report plus incentives condition confounded incentives with immediate feedback. 
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That is, participants were given feedback on their performance, and thus reinforced for “don’t  
know” responding, after every question.  There were four conditions in Roebers and Schneider 
(Experiment 2): incentives plus feedback, feedback only (no incentives), incentives only (the 
experimenter recorded the responses and tallied the score at the end), and free report (neither 
incentives nor feedback).  Again, the incentives plus feedback condition yielded the highest 
quality reports for all age groups.  It should be noted that, unlike the previous two studies, all 
children in Roebers and Schneider’s  study received instructions to say “don’t  know.”  Taken 
together, these studies suggest that even young children are capable of effectively monitoring 
their memories but may require a combination of both motivation and continuous feedback. 
Interim summary. Available evidence dispels any concern that interview instructions will 
be uniformly unhelpful to young children, as benefits have been found among children as young 
as 4 years (e.g., a collection of instructions that included interviewer naiveté in Krackow & 
Lynn, 2010, and warning instruction by Endres & colleagues, Study 1, 1999).  Moreover, in 
some contexts instruction effects are greater among younger than older children (who sometimes 
perform well without instructions; e.g., naiveté instruction in Waterman & Blades, 2011).  
Nevertheless, the research reveals neither a clear lower nor upper bound on the ages at which 
individual ground rules improve performance.   
As predicted by our discussion of the cognitive underpinnings of ground rule 
understanding, some ground rules appear to be conceptually difficult for children (or at least 
difficult to implement as intended), and for these rules practice or more thorough explanation is 
necessary to produce the desired effects (“correct  me  when  I’m  wrong”  instructions  in Krackow 
& Lynn, 2010, and Saywitz & Moan-Hardie, 1994;;  selective  use  of  the  “I  don’t  know”  rule).  It 
is unclear whether “some  questions  may  be  repeated”  results have been disappointing because 
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the concept is difficult or the instruction does not remedy the mechanism underlying response 
changes to repeated questions (see Howie, Kulasuriya, Nash, & Marsh, 2009).  The paucity of 
information on most ground rules (including “tell  me  when  you don’t  understand”), along with 
procedural variations that prevent confident conclusions about which sets of rules are most 
appropriate for children in various age groups, motivated the following study space analysis.             
Study Space Analysis  
The purpose of a study space analysis is to highlight combinations of variables that have 
received concentrated attention and those that have not, thereby “alerting  investigators  to  
territories that have been well worked over and to others where new contributions  can  be  made”  
(Malpass et al., 2008, p. 794).  We included only published research with child participants and 
studies that included a comparison group of participants who did not receive the rule.  As most of 
the  research  concerning  children’s  ground  rules  understanding  has  used  the  same  or  similar  
dependent variables (i.e., number or proportion accurate, inaccurate, and sometimes ”don’t  
know”), we focused our study-space analysis on independent variables, that is, what has been 
studied rather than what has been found.  It has been suggested that this approach is particularly 
relevant for situations in which the research question may have an influence on policy 
development because it makes clear which attributes or combinations thereof have and have not 
been systematically studied (Malpass et al., 2008).    
For our study space (see Table 2), we included the 21 experiments listed in Table 1 and the 
five ground rules we reviewed earlier: Naïve (a statement that the interviewer was not there and 
does not know what happened); Correct (a specific instruction to correct the interviewer when a 
mistake  has  been  made);;  Repeated  (a  warning  that  some  question  may  be  repeated);;  Don’t  
Understand (an instruction to tell the interviewer when the child has not understood something); 
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and  Don’t  Know  (an  instruction  to  say  “I  don’t  know”).  We also included important independent 
variables: age, delay, whether or not the target event was live, and whether or not the ground rule 
was practiced by the child.  Because there are dramatic improvements in the development of 
cognitive skills across the preschool and elementary school ages, we broke age group down into 
five levels (3-4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, and 11-13).  Delay was also split into five levels (less than 1 day; 
1–7 days, 8–27 days; 28–35 days, and more than 35 days).  There were no studies that included 
delays of more than 35 days (i.e., five weeks), but we included it to provide an upper limit for 
this variable and to highlight the lack of research assessing ground rules at forensically relevant 
delays.  Because the bulk of studies we reviewed (n  = 15) included the “don’t  know” rule, we 
conducted a more detailed study space analysis for this rule only (see Table 3).     
Unlike other examples of study space analyses (e.g., Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 2010), 
we were not able to split all variables of interest into mutually-exclusive categories because 
individual studies comprise multiple ground rules and age categories, and some include more 
than one delay (i.e., multiple interviews).  Thus, the total percentages in Tables 2 and 3 do not 
sum to 100%.  Consequently, it is neither possible nor meaningful to compare percentages to an 
expected count per cell.  Nonetheless, we bolded combinations representing less than 15% of the 
study space in Table 2 and less than 25% of the study space in Table 3.  These values were 
chosen arbitrarily but with the intent to highlight understudied combinations.  In Tables 2 and 3, 
the Roebers studies (Roebers et al., 2001; Roebers & Fernandez, 2002) were not categorized 
according to whether or not they included practice, so percentages for the Practice cells were 
calculated out of 19 and 13, respectively.      
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Caveats and Limitations  
 Despite our efforts to include all published studies concerning the use of five common 
ground rules, this review is not exhaustive: Some ground  rules  were  not  included  (e.g.,  “it’s  ok  to  
use any  words  you  want”), we could have missed studies (though hopefully our careful search 
and reviewers’ knowledge minimized this problem), and we did not include unpublished work 
and work that did not appear in peer-reviewed journals.  As such, the review may be biased 
toward research that found effects of ground rules (although certainly some studies with null 
effects were published, e.g., Ellis et al, 2003; Peterson & Grant, 2001).  Nevertheless, the study 
space, discussed in the subsequent section, identifies important gaps in this literature that can 
provide starting points for future work in this area.      
Call for Research   
Based on the current review and the study space analysis, it is evident that despite their 
inclusion in investigative interview protocols, ground rules other than the “don’t  know” 
instruction have received little attention.  Some omissions are less surprising than others.  For 
example, given that older children are unlikely to require information that the interviewer is 
naïve (e.g., Waterman & Blades, 2011), it is perhaps less urgent to conduct research on this rule 
with 11- to 13-year-old children (see Table 2).  Still, such studies would be informative for 
establishing boundary conditions, which would allow front-line interviewers to bypass 
preparatory techniques for some of their cases.  No published research has attempted to explain 
to 3- and 4-year-olds that they should express when they have not understood something, and a 
clearer understanding of the cognitive skills necessary for grasping this rule may point to ways in 
which preschoolers can be aided in expressing comprehension failures.  Older children (9- to 13-
year-olds) should be especially likely to benefit from this rule, but no research has been 
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conducted on the “don’t  understand” rule with this age group either.  The overall study space 
analysis primarily points to the conclusion that more work is needed with respect to ground rules 
beyond just the “don’t  know” instruction. 
The follow-up analysis (Table 3) concerning this relatively well-studied rule shows that 
more research is needed at longer delays.  Also, while there are roughly equal numbers of older 
children who were or were not given practice in using the “don’t  know” rule, most studies 
involving 3- to 6-year-olds have not included practice.  A pending report by Dickinson, 
Brubacher, and Poole (2014) suggests that the youngest children benefit most from additional 
attempts to ensure that this rule has been understood (i.e., by giving them a chance to practice 
saying “don’t  know”  along with performance-related feedback).       
The study space was conducted not only to identify gaps in the combinations of variables 
that have been studied but also as a springboard for facilitating increased links between 
developmental researchers (who provide the foundation for predicting developmental differences 
in ground rules understanding) and those working in the field of psychology-law (who frame 
their questions in terms of standards for best-practice interviewing and the needs of front-line 
practitioners).  The study space, therefore, is meant as a launching point for researchers who 
want  to  explore  relationships  among  children’s  ability  to  benefit  from  certain  rules  and  
developments in metacognition. 
As we have suggested, developmental theory points to strong links between the capacity to 
make sense of and employ ground rules, and aspects of ToM and metacognition.  Importantly, 
certain skills should be related to some ground rules but not others.  For example, we proposed 
that children who can pass knowledge access tasks should be more likely to understand and 
benefit from information about interviewer naiveté than same-aged peers who do not pass.  It 
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may be the case, however, that additional executive skills, such as rule maintenance, must also 
be in place.  We also implied that procedural metacognition should be more strongly associated 
with strategic responding to option-posing than wh- “don’t  know” questions and hope this 
assumption will be tested.  Research that measures theory-of-mind and cognitive 
control/executive  function  along  with  direct  assessments  of  children’s  understanding  of  ground  
rules, ability to profit from the rules, and memory for the rules at the conclusion of the interview 
would be equally informative.   
Developmentally-oriented research questions that link cognitive abilities to both 
comprehension and the ability to use each ground rule could inform how interview instructions 
(and practice) should be delivered and to what ages. Some of the research we reviewed included 
lengthy training packages that would be impractical in forensic interviews (although may be 
excellent courtroom preparation for a child who is expected to be cross-examined), and others 
would be impossible in the real world (e.g., giving tokens for correct responses).  We suggest, 
however, that with advanced knowledge of the foundational cognitive skills for ground-rules 
understanding it may be possible to make practice developmentally appropriate without the need 
for extensive or impractical procedures.  
One avenue for research into revising ground rules practice relates to the format of the 
questions (e.g.,  “Is  my  dog’s  name  Fido?”  versus  “What’s  my  dog’s  name?”).    That  is,  does  
practice responding to yes-no practice questions confer benefits on both yes-no and wh- 
questions during the target interview or only on the former (and vice versa for wh- questions)?  
Given the difference in depth of processing needed to answer recognition versus recall questions, 
it could be predicted that ground rules presented in the wh- format would result in a more 
effective practice of the rule than when presented in a forced-choice manner, especially for 
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younger children.  Similarly unclear is the optimal placement of ground rules; specifically, 
before or after the narrative practice phase.  Lamb and colleagues (2013) have moved the ground 
rules discussion to follow the narrative practice phase so that interviewers have already 
established themselves as naïve before delivering the rules (although this is an empirical question 
that has yet to be answered).  There could be opportunities within the practice phase, however, 
for children to encounter situations in which they could make use of ground rules.  For example, 
an  unanswerable  question  could  be  asked  (“What  happened  after  you  left…?”), and occasions to 
correct  the  interviewer  and  to  say  “I  don’t  understand”  could  also  be  created.    Future  research  
should also assess whether additional benefits are observed when rules are reinforced later on 
during the interview.  Thus, there is ample fodder for analog research to investigate the optimal 
format, placement, and frequency, of ground rules instructions, and resolving these questions is 
of great relevance to the interviewing community.   
  Notably absent from our review were field studies that explored the use of ground rules 
because few exist.  An exception is a recent study by Teoh and Lamb (2010), who assessed 
interviews conducted in Malaysia according to the NICHD protocol with 5-15 year old alleged 
victims of sexual abuse.  Interviewers used significantly more instructive prompts (i.e., ground 
rules) with the 13- to 15-year-olds than with the 5- to 7-year-olds.  Yet, the number of instructive 
prompts with the youngest age group was strongly positively correlated with the proportion of 
informative responses in the substantive phase, suggesting that this younger group stood to 
benefit most (similar to the findings of Dickinson et al., 2014).  In the only other field study we 
are aware of, Earhart, La Rooy, Willemsen, Brubacher and Lamb (in press) assessed the use of 
the “don’t  know” ground rule in interviews with alleged sexual abuse victims (4 –14) conducted 
according to the Memorandum of Good Practice.  Half of the interviews contained the “don’t  
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know” ground rule instruction and half did not, but interviewers treated children similarly 
regardless of whether or not they had delivered the rule.  That is, across all interviews and 
regardless of the presence or absence of the rule, 30%  of  children’s  don’t  know  statements  were  
rejected either explicitly (7%; e.g., “I think you do really know”) or implicitly (e.g., by repeating 
the question).  This field study merits experimental replication.  Specifically, if interviewers 
deliver  a  ground  rule  (e.g.,  “tell  me  when  you  don’t  understand”)  and  then reject children’s  
attempts  to  use  the  rule,  what  happens  to  children’s  reports  in  terms  of  their  willingness  to  use  
the rule on subsequent opportunities, their accuracy, and their motivation?   
Conclusion 
 The  use  of  ground  rules  to  improve  children’s  reports of experienced events is an area of 
study rich with possibilities for further exploration.  Such research is urgently needed given that 
ground rules are already included in many forensic interview protocols despite inadequate 
information (for most rules) about where in an interview they should be delivered, the optimal 
format of instruction, the extent of training and practice necessary to achieve benefits, and how 
these  factors  vary  as  a  function  of  children’s  ages  and  levels of cognitive ability.  Such research 
has implications for broadening our understanding of cognitive development and for front-line 
forensic interviewers tasked with eliciting the highest quality information that is possible from 
alleged child witnesses and victims.       
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Table 1 
Experiments Testing the Efficacy of Ground Rules 
           Study Age Delay (days) Live a Practice b Naïve Correct Repeat c DU d DK e  
Beuscher & Roebers (2005) 6, 8, 10 7 N N X 
    Cordón et al. (2005) 3-6 <1, 16, 34 Y Y X 
   
X 
Ellis et al. (2003) 4-5 8, 15, & 22 Y N 
 
X 
  
X 
Endres et al. (1999) Study 1 4-7 <1 N N 
    
X 
Endres et al. (1999) Study 2 5-6 <1 N N 
    
X 
Geddie et al. (2001) 3 – 6 8-12 Y Y X X X 
 
X 
Gee et al. (1999) Study 1 9-10, 11-13 5-8 Y Y 
 
X 
  
X 
Gee et al. (1999) Study 2 9-11 4-7 Y Y 
 
X 
  
X 
Krackow & Lynn (2010) 4-5, 7-8 12-21 Y Y X X 
   Memon & Vartoukian (1996) 5, 7 <1 Y N 
  
X 
  Moston (1987) 6, 8, 10 <1 Y N 
    
X 
Mulder & Vrij (1996) 4-5, 8-10  <1 Y Y X 
   
X 
Nesbitt & Markham (1999) 3-5 <1 N N 
    
X 
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Peters & Nunez (1999) 4, 5-6, 7-8 <1 N Y    X  
Peterson & Grant (2001) 3-5 7 Y N 
    
X 
Roebers et al. (2001) 6, 7, 8, adult 21 N f 
    
X 
Roebers & Fernandez (2002) 6, 7, 8, adult 21 N f 
    
X 
Saywitz & Moan-Hardie (1994) 
Study 1 7 14 Y Y X X 
  
X 
Saywitz & Moan-Hardie (1994) 
Study 2 7 14 Y Y X X 
  
X 
Saywitz et al., 1999 6, 8 16 Y Y 
   
X 
 Waterman & Blades (2011)  
Study 1 5-6, 7-8 1  Y N X 
    Note: X indicates the presence of the rule in the study instructions.  a Live refers to whether or not the to-be-remembered event was 
experienced live.  b Practice refers to whether or not children explicitly practiced the rule. c Repeat = a warning that some questions 
may be repeated. d DU = the “don’t  understand” rule.  e DK = the “don’t  know” rule.  f The Roebers studies include feedback (and thus 
reinforcement) after each response and thus were not categorized according to practice. 
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Table 2 
Study Space Analysis Including All Ground Rules Across 21 Experiments 
   
 
  
 Naïve Correct Repeat a DUb DKc 
  
Total (8) (7) (2) (2) (15) 
Age 3-4 (9) 4    
(19%) 
3  
(14%) 
1 
(5%)  
1  
(5%) 
7  
(33%) 
 
5-6 (17) 6  
(29%)  
3  
(14%) 
2     
(10%) 
2  
(10%)  
11  
(52%) 
 7-8 (13)  6    
(29%) 
3  
(14%) 
1  
 (5%) 
2  
(10%) 
7  
(33%)  
 9-10 (5) 2  
(10%) 
2  
(10%) 
0  
(0%)  
0  
(0%) 
4  
(19%) 
 11-13 (2) 0  
(0%) 
2  
(10%) 
0  
(0%) 
0  
(0%) 
2  
(10%) 
Delay 
(days) 
<1 (8) 2  
(10%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(5%) 
1 
(5%) 
6 
(29%) 
 
1-7 (5) 2 
(10%) 
2  
(10%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
3 
(14%) 
 
8-27 (9) 5  
(24%) 
6 
(29%) 
1 
(5%) 
1 
(5%) 
7 
(33%) 
 
28-35 (1) 1  
(5%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1  
(5%) 
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> 35 (0) 0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
Live d Yes (14) 7  
(33%) 
7  
(33%) 
2 
(10%) 
1  
(5%) 
10 
(48%) 
 
No (7) 1  
(5%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(5%) 
5  
(24%) 
Practice 
(19) e 
Yes (10) 6  
(32%) 
6 
(32%) 
1  
(5%) 
2  
(11%) 
7 
(37%) 
 
No (9) 2  
(11%) 
1  
(5%) 
1  
(5%) 
0 
(0%) 
6 
(32%) 
 
Note: The percentages of experiments representing each cell in the panel appear in parentheses; 
values less than 15% are bolded.   a Repeat = a warning that some questions may be repeated. b 
DU  =  the  “don’t  understand”  rule.  c DK  =  the  “don’t  know”  rule.    d Live refers to whether or not 
the to-be-remembered event was experienced live.  e Practice refers to whether or not children 
explicitly practiced the rule.  The denominator for this section of the table was 19 because the 
two Roebers studies include feedback (and thus reinforcement) after each response and thus were 
not categorized according to practice.  
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Table 3  
 
Study Space Analysis of the “Don’t  Know” Ground Rule Across 15 Experiments 
 
  
Age  Delay (days)  Live 
  
3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 11-13  <1 1-7 8-27 28-35  Yes No 
 Delay <1 
4  
(27%) 
6  
(40%) 
3  
(20%) 
2 
(13%) 
0  
(0%) 
 
        
 
    
(days) 1-7 
1  
(7%) 
1  
(7%) 
0  
(0%) 
2 
(13%) 
2  
(13%) 
 
        
 
    
 
8-27 
3  
(20%) 
5  
(33%) 
4  
(27%) 
0  
(0%) 
0  
(0%) 
 
        
 
    
 
28-
35 
1  
(7%) 
1  
(7%) 
0  
(0%) 
0  
(0%) 
0  
(0%) 
 
        
 
    
 
> 35 
0  
(0%) 
0  
(0%) 
0  
(0%) 
0  
(0%) 
0  
(0%) 
 
    
 
  
Livea Yes 
5  
(33%) 
6  
(40%) 
4  
(27%) 
4 
(27%) 
2  
(13%) 
 3 
(20%) 
3  
(20%) 
5 
(33%) 
1  
(7%) 
 
    
 
No 2 (13%) 
5  
(33%) 
3  
(20%) 
0  
(0%) 
0  
(0%) 
 3 
(20%) 
0  
(0%) 
2 
(13%) 
0  
(0%) 
 
    
Practiceb Yes 3 (23%) 
3  
(23%)  
3  
(23%) 
3 
(23%) 
2  
(15%) 
 2 
(15%) 
2  
(15%) 
5 
(39%) 
1  
(8%) 
 7 
(54%) 
0 
(0%) 
  No 4 (31%) 
6  
(46%) 
2  
(15%) 
1 
(8%) 
0  
(0%) 
 4 
(31%) 
1  
(8%) 
1 
(8%) 
0  
(0%) 
 3 
(23%) 
3 
(23%) 
Note: The percentages of experiments representing each cell in the panel appear in parentheses; values less than 25% are bolded. 
 a Live refers to whether or not the to-be-remembered event was experienced live.  b Practice refers to whether or not children 
explicitly practiced the rule.  The denominator for this section of the table was 13 because the two Roebers studies include feedback 
(and thus reinforcement) after each response and thus were not categorized according to practice.  
